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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (SUNY) at 
ORANGE a/k/a ORANGE COUNTY COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE,
Defendant.
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Michael Howard Sussman, Esq.
Mary Jo Whateley, Esq.
Sussman & Watkins 
Goshen, New York 
Counsel for Plaintiff
Hyun Chin Kim, Esq.
Orange County Attorney 
Goshen, New York 
Counsel for Defendant
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Plaintiff Chester Widomski brings this action against Defendant State University of New 
York (SUNY) at Orange, also known as Orange County Community College (“OCCC”), 
alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 et seq., and the New York Human Rights Law, 15 N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(2)(a). (Second 
Amend. Compl. at Ex. A (“SAC”) ^ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against 
him by preventing his participation in a phlebotomy clinical program based on his hands 
shaking, a perceived disability, and brought a disciplinary action against him in retaliation for
complaining about the discrimination. (Id.) Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all 
claims. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion is granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from the Parties’ submissions and are undisputed except as 
otherwise indicated. In 2008, Plaintiff was a student at OCCC concentrating in the Medical 
Laboratory Technology Program (the “Lab Tech Program”). (Def.’s Rule 56.1(a) Statement 
(“Def. 56.1”) T 1; Rosamaria Contarino Aff. at Ex. G (“Contarino Aff.”) T 3.) During the 2008 
fall semester, Plaintiff enrolled in the Clinical Training I class, a required course for the Lab 
Tech Program that included “routine tasks” in hematology, clinical chemistry, urinalysis, and 
phlebotomy. (Def. 56.1 TT 1-2; Contarino Aff. T 3, ex. B.) Plaintiff was assigned to Catskill 
Regional Medical Center (“CRMC”) in Sullivan County, (Pl. Decl. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for 
Summary Judgment (“Pl. Decl.”) T 4; Contarino Aff. T 3), and Rebecca Sander (“Sander”), an 
employee of CRMC (and not OCCC), was assigned as his proctor. (Def. 56.1 T 16; Rebecca 
Sander Dep. at Ex. 3 (“Sander Dep.”) at 20-22, 117-18.) Among other course requirements, the 
Clinical Training I course required that each student submit weekly clinical summary reports 
signed by his or her proctor and accompanied by a narrative. (Def. 56.1 T 3; Pl.’s Rule 56.1(a) 
Statement (“Pl. 56.1”) T 5; Pl.’s Counter Rule 56.1(a) Statement (“Pl.’s Counter 56.1”) T 1; 
Contarino Aff. T 3, ex. B.)1 The weekly clinical summary reports consist of standardized forms 
with blanks for date and time; a list of procedures with blank boxes to indicate number observed,
1 The Court notes that the paragraph numbering in Plaintiff’s 56.1 Statement is somewhat 
disordered. For ease of reference, the Court cites to the paragraph numbers as they appear in 
Plaintiff’s submission.
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number performed, and whether competency was achieved; an area for comments; and signature 
blanks for the proctor and student. (Contarino Aff. ^ 3, ex. B.)
At some point prior to October 7, 2008, Sander conveyed to Plaintiff that he was not 
permitted to participate in the phlebotomy portion of the clinical, a decision she states was based 
on her personal observations of Plaintiff’s hands shaking, (Def. 56.1 ^ 16; Rosamaria Contarino 
Dep. at Ex. D (“Contarino Dep.”) at 81; Sander Dep. at 60-61; Pl. Decl. 2, 6), a 
characterization disputed by Plaintiff, (Pl. 56.1 ^ 13).
On October 7, 2008, Plaintiff met with Rosamaria Contarino, the Department Chair of 
the Lab Tech Program, and discussed the fact that the required weekly summary reports and 
narratives had not been submitted. (Def. 56.1 ^ 4; Pl. 56.1 ^  3-5; Contarino Aff. ^ 4.) 
Specifically, as of October 7, 2008, the seventh week of the semester, Plaintiff had not submitted 
any clinical training summary sheets and had submitted only a small number of narratives. (Def.
56.1 ^ 4; Pl. 56.1^ 4-5; Contarino Aff. ^ 4.) The Parties dispute whether Plaintiff or Sander was 
at fault for the failure to provide the reports.2 During the meeting, Contarino and Plaintiff signed 
a written agreement that Plaintiff would submit the required documentation by no later than 
October 9, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. to avoid receiving an F in the course. (Contarino Aff. ^ 5, ex. C.)
Plaintiff and Contarino also discussed the decision to prohibit Plaintiff from participating
2 Plaintiff argues that he was “precluded from [providing the weekly clinical training 
summary sheets] by Sander’s continued refusal to sign the sheets,” (Pl. 56.1 ^ 2), and that 
“Sander adamantly refused to sign the weekly reports, thus, frustrating [Plaintiff’s attempts to 
comply with [Contarino’s] dictate that he [submit them] by October 8th, under threat of her 
failing him with an ‘F’,” (id. ^ 10). At her deposition, Sander testified that she would not 
indicate competency on the sheets until the student demonstrated proficiency: “[Contarino’s] 
expectations are when a student successfully is able to perform a task, that the paperwork will be 
submitted. That’s the expectations. I am not going to just write yeses and numbers when 
somebody is not doing the work . . . . Again, I would not fill out papers saying that someone is 
competent when they’re not.” (Sander Dep. at 55-56.)
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in the phlebotomy portion of the clinical due to his shaking hands. (Pl. Decl. ^ 7; SAC ^ 13; 
Chester Widomski Dep. at Ex. B (“Widomski Dep.”) at 41, 45; Contarino Dep. at 81-83.) 
Contarino conveyed to Plaintiff that as a result of not participating in the phlebotomy clinical 
portion, he would be permitted to graduate from the Lab Tech Program, but he would not be 
permitted to receive a medical technician license. (Pl. Decl. ^ 2; Widomski Dep. at 41, 45; 
Contarino Dep. at 81-83.)
The following day, October 8, 2008, Contarino received faxed clinical training and 
narratives from Plaintiff, including a urinalysis summary report dated October 1, 2008 and a 
hematology summary report dated October 8, 2008. (Def. 56.1 ^  11-12; Pl. 56.1 ^  8-9; 
Contarino Aff. ^ 6, exs. D, E.)
Two key events occurred on October 27, 2008. First, Contarino again notified Plaintiff 
that he had not submitted the proper clinical documentation. (Def. 56.1 13-14; Pl. 56.1 ^  10­
11; Contarino Aff. ^ 7.) Second, Plaintiff’s counsel drafted a letter to Contarino requesting that 
Plaintiff be permitted to complete the entire Lab Tech Program, including the phlebotomy 
clinical. (Def. 56.1 ^ 15; Ltr. from Michael Sussman at Ex. 1.) It is not clear in which order 
these events occurred.
On November 4, 2008, Contarino received faxed clinical training summary sheets, 
specifically a urinalysis summary report and a hematology summary report, both dated October 
29, 2008. (Def. 56.1 ^  17-18; Pl. 56.1 ^  14-15; Contarino Aff. ^ 8, exs. D, E.) Upon receiving 
the reports, Cantarino observed that they appeared to be identical to the October 1 and October 8, 
2008 reports with the exception of the new dates and the addition of the letter “Y” in the 
competency column of the urinalysis report and the word “Yes” in the competency column of 
the hematology report. (Def. 56.1 ^  20-21; Contarino Aff. ^ 8, exs. D, E .) Sander testified that
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she signed the urinalysis and hematology reports, dated October 1, 2008 and October 8, 2008 
respectively, but that she did not sign the reports dated October 29, 2008, nor did she write the 
“Y” and “Yes” that appear in the competency columns of those reports. (Def. 56.1 21-22; Pl.
56.1 fflf 18-19; Sander Dep. at 123.)
The next day, November 5, 2008, after observing the suspicious similarities in the forms, 
Contarino forwarded the matter to Paul Broadie, Vice President of Student Services, for 
disciplinary action. (Def. 56.1 ^ 23; Pl. 56.1 ^ 21; Contarino Aff. ^  8-9, 11; Paul Broadie Aff. 
at Ex. H (“Broadie Aff.”) ^ 2.) A few days later, on November 8, 2008, Broadie met with 
Plaintiff and discussed the alleged violation of the Student Code of Conduct; Plaintiff also 
conveyed his version of events to Broadie. (Def. 56.1 fflf 25-28; Pl. 56.1 ^  21-26; Contarino 
Aff. ^ 11; Broadie Aff. ^ 3.) At the time of this meeting, Broadie was unaware of the October 
27, 2008 letter from Plaintiff’s counsel to Contarino, except to the extent that Plaintiff’s wife 
suggested that she thought the purpose of the meeting was to address a letter from Plaintiff’s 
attorney. (Def. 56.1 ^ 30; Pl. 56.1 ^ 27; Paul Broadie Dep. at Ex. E (“Broadie Dep.”) at 55-57; 
Widomski Dep. at 69.)
On November 11, 2008, Broadie offered Plaintiff an informal sanction to resolve the 
matter: Plaintiff would receive an F and be required to withdraw from the Lab Tech Program. 
(Def. 56.1 ^ 29; Pl. 56.1 ^ 26; Broadie Aff. ^ 4.) Broadie also indicated that Plaintiff was not 
required to accept the informal sanction and instead could elect a formal hearing. (Def. 56.1 
^ 31; Pl. 56.1 ^ 31; Broadie Aff. ^ 4.) Plaintiff declined the informal sanction and requested the 
formal hearing. (Def. 56.1 ^ 32; Pl. 56.1 ^ 32; Broadie Aff. ^ 4.)
On December 9, 2008, a Board of Inquiry, composed of three faculty members and four 
members of the student body with no connection to Plaintiff, met to consider the matter. (Def.
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56.1 fflf 32-33; Pl. 56.1 fflf 32-33; Widomski Dep. at 71; Broadie Aff. ^ 6.) Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s 
counsel, and Contarino attended the hearing; Broadie was not involved in the proceeding, and 
Sander did not attend. (Def. 56.1 ^  34-35; Pl. 56.1 ^ 34-35; Pl. Counter 56.1 ^ 17; Def. Reply 
Rule 56.1(a) Statement ^ 17; Widomski Dep. at 71-72; Sander Dep. at 7-8.) The Parties dispute 
whether Plaintiff and his attorney were permitted meaningful participation in the meeting, but 
there is no dispute that Plaintiff did provide statements to the Board. (Pl. 56.1 ^ 34; Pl. Counter
56.1 ^ 18; SAC ^ 25; Widomski Dep. at 72-73; Further Dep. of Chester Widomski at Ex. C at 
19-20.)
On December 12, 2008, the Board of Inquiry found Plaintiff guilty of violating the 
Student Code of Conduct and recommended that he be expelled from the Lab Tech Program, be 
prohibited from enrolling in any other Allied Health program, and be suspended from OCCC 
until fall 2009. (Def. 56.1 fflf 35-36; Pl. 56.1 fflf 35-36; Broadie Aff. ^ 8.) Broadie adopted this 
recommendation. (Def. 56.1 ^ 37; Pl. 56.1 ^ 37; Broadie Aff. ^ 8; Broadie Dep. at 80-81.) 
Plaintiff appealed the decision to Dr. William Richards, President of OCCC, and after examining 
documentation and meeting with Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife, Broadie, Contarino, and Sander (via 
speaker phone), Richards upheld the decision on January 14, 2009. (Def. 56.1 ^  38-41; Pl. 56.1 
38-41; Broadie Aff. ^ 10; Ltr. from William Richards at Ex. 4 at 79-80.)
B. Procedural History
On August 27, 2009 Plaintiff filed suit against OCCC in this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) 
Following a pre-motion conference, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to file an amended 
complaint, which was submitted on January 7, 2010. (Dkt. No. 8.) After additional 
correspondence, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in the case, 
on November 29, 2010. (Dkt. No. 10.) Following discovery, Defendant filed the instant motion
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for summary judgment on March 16, 2012, (Dkt. No. 22), Plaintiff responded on April 19, 2012, 
(Dkt. No. 33), and Defendant submitted its Reply on May 7, 2012, (Dkt. No. 31). The Court held 
oral argument on February 8, 2013.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be granted where the movant shows that there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “When 
ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable 
inferences against the movant.” Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d 
Cir. 2003); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting 
that a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue 
of material fact exists. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CSX Lines, L.L.C., 432 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 
2005). “When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is 
sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential 
element of the nonmovant’s claim. In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with 
admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary 
judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do 
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (footnote omitted);
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see also McPherson v. N.Y. City Dep’t o f Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[Speculation alone is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”). A fact is 
material when “it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” McCarthy v. Dun & 
Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). At 
summary judgment, a court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining its truth, 
but with determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 735 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). A court’s goal should be to 
“isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
In the Title VII context, courts are to be “particularly cautious” about granting summary 
judgment to employers in cases where the discriminatory intent of the employer is contested. 
Schwapp v. Town o f Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Schiano v. Quality Payroll 
Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n extra measure of caution is merited in . . . summary 
judgment in a discrimination action because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is rare and 
such intent often must be inferred from circumstantial evidence found in affidavits and 
depositions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, “[i]t is . . . beyond cavil that 
summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination 
cases.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, while 
district courts must pay careful attention to affidavits and depositions which may reveal 
circumstantial proof of discrimination, see Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd., 22 F.3d 
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994), courts are not to “‘treat discrimination differently from other ultimate 
questions of fact,’” Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Prods., Inc, 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)).
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B. Analysis
1. Title II Claim
Plaintiff brings his discrimination claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, which provides 
in relevant part: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of 
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is based entirely on a “perceived disability,” the shaking of 
Plaintiff’s hands; indeed, Plaintiff denies that the hand shaking was ever an actual disability.
(SAC ^  2, 33.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails for two reasons: (1) Title II does not 
protect perceived disabilities, and (2) even if a “perceived disability” is covered by Title II,
OCCC never regarded Plaintiff as having a disability. (Defendant’s Mem. of Law. (“Def. Mem.”) 
at 6-11.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
a. Whether Title II Protects a Perceived Disability 
Defendant first argues that Title II does not protect individuals with “perceived 
disabilities,” because the definition of disability is more narrow for Title II than for other parts of 
the ADA. (Def. Mem. at 6-7.) The Court begins with the statutory scheme and the plain 
language found therein: The ADA is codified at 42 U.S.C. chapter 126, which includes several 
sections followed by sub-chapters containing the provisions known as Title I (employment), Title 
II (public services), and Title III (public accommodations and services operated by private 
entities). The second section, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), defines disability, “as used in this chapter,” 
with a three-prong test: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
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as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990) (emphasis added).3 As clearly 
stated in the third prong, part (C), being regarded as having a disability, i.e. having a perceived 
disability, is included in the definition. Moreover, nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that 
the definition of disability differs between the Titles—on the contrary, the definitions section 
includes an explicit statement that the listed terms are defined “as used in this chapter.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102.
Consistent with this statutory language, the Supreme Court has suggested that the three- 
prong definition of disability in § 12102(2) applies to the entire ADA, not just particular Titles. 
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) (“[T]he Act’s 
definition of ‘disability’ applies not only to Title I of the Act . . . .”), overturned by legislative 
action on other grounds, U.S. Pub. L. 110-325 (effective Jan. 1, 2009); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 589 n.2 (1999) (quoting the entire definition found in § 12102(2) in a 
Title II case); A majority of lower courts also have cited the full three-prong statutory definition 
in Title II cases. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 274 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
definition of ‘disability’ applies to all of the ADA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Weixel v. 
Bd. o f Educ. o f City o f New York, 287 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (analyzing the § 12102(2) 
definition in considering a Title II ADA claim); Mascetti v. Zozulin, No. 09-CV-963, 2010 WL 
1644572, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2010) (same); Giraldi v. Bd. o f Parole, State o f New York, No. 
04-CV-877, 2009 WL 3191530, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (same).
3 Among other changes, the 2008 ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) modified the 
definition of disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008). However, the revisions are not relevant to the question of whether the § 12102 definition 
applies to Title II, and, as explained later, the Amendments are not retroactive to conduct 
occurring before January 1, 2009, see infra Part II (B)(1)(b). Therefore, for consistency, the 
Court cites the statutory language as it existed prior to the ADAAA unless otherwise noted.
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Notwithstanding this authority, Defendant relies on two cases from the Northern District 
of New York for the proposition that “disability” in Title II only refers to the first two prongs of 
the § 12102(2) definition and does not include the third “regarded as” prong. (Def. Mem. at 7.) 
Defendant’s cited cases appear to have emerged from a single footnote in Farid v. Bouey, 554 F. 
Supp. 2d 301 (N.D.N.Y. 2008): “[The ADA] definition section appears to apply only to disability 
discrimination in the employment setting under Title I of the ADA, and discrimination based 
upon a perceived disability is not similarly actionable under Title II . . . .” Farid, 554 F. Supp. 2d 
at 327 n.19; accord Lee v. City o f Syracuse, 603 F. Supp. 2d 417, 441 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing 
Farid, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27).4 In reaching this conclusion, the Farid court noted that the 
Rehabilitation Act “offers essentially the same protections to those with disabilities as does Title 
II,” Farid, 445 F.Supp. 2d at 326, and then cited the slightly different definition of disability 
found in the Rehabilitation Act regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84.3, see Farid, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 327 
n.19.
This Court respectfully disagrees. The Court does not dispute that the Rehabilitation Act 
and Title II of the ADA have similar purposes, see Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr. o f 
Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 113 (2d Cir. 2001), but the plain language of § 12102 provides that its 
definitions apply “as used in this chapter,” which counsels against replacing the ADA definition 
of disability with the Rehabilitation Act regulatory definition for the purposes of applying an
4 The Court has identified a third case within the Second Circuit that adopts, without 
comment, the narrow definition of disability articulated in Farid. See Silvagnoli v. Fischer, No. 
07-CV-561, 2010 WL 1063849, at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing Farid v. Bouey, 554 
F.Supp.2d 301, 326 (N.D.N.Y.2008)), adopted by 2010 WL 1063840 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010); 
see also McDonald v. Penn. State Police, No. 09-CV-00442, 2012 WL 5381403, at *10 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 31, 2012) (referencing these Northern District of New York cases but rejecting the claim 
at issue on other grounds).
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ADA title. In any event, it appears to this Court that the Rehabilitation Act regulatory definition 
includes at least some perceived disabilities. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (defining a handicapped 
person as “any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one 
or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having 
such an impairment.” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, in light of the weight of controlling authority and the plain language of the 
ADA itself, the Court finds that the term disability as used in Title II is defined by § 12102, and 
includes an individual “regarded as” having a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
b. Whether Defendant Perceived Plaintiff As Having a Disability
Defendant next argues that even if Title II protects perceived disabilities, OCCC did not 
perceive or regard Plaintiff as having a disability as defined by the ADA. (Def. Mem. at 7-11.)
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine the proper legal framework for evaluating 
this question. In 2008, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act (the “ADAAA”), which 
went into effect on January 1, 2009. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (Sept. 25, 2008). Among other amendments, the ADAAA modified the operative 
definition of a perceived disability by adding the following language: “An individual meets the 
requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he 
or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a 
major life activity.” Id. § 3(3). The ADAAA also explicitly rejected the holdings in two 
Supreme Court cases, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), stating that those decisions 
“have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA.” Id. § 2.
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Plaintiff block quotes the new statutory language without addressing the question of retroactivity, 
(Plaintiff’s Mem. of Law (“Pl. Mem.”) at 7-8), while Defendant argues that the ADAAA is not 
applicable, because the conduct at issue occurred before the ADAAA went into effect on January 
1, 2009, (Def. Mem. at 7, n.2).
In considering ADA claims based on conduct that occurred prior to 2009, the Second 
Circuit has applied “the version of the statute in effect during the time period at issue.” Ragusa v. 
Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 F. App’x 85, 87 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Price v. Mount 
Sinai Hosp., 458 F. App’x 49, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (relying on Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. 
because the events at issue occurred prior to the ADAAA superseding it); Fredricksen v. United 
Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 521 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “Congress did not 
express its intent for [the ADAAA] to apply retroactively, and so we look to the law in place prior 
to the amendments”); Lytes v. DC Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(citing the ADAAA’s delayed effective date, other evidence of legislative intent, and the 
presumption against retroactivity to hold that ADAAA does not apply retroactively); E.E.O.C. v. 
Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that ADAAA does not apply 
retroactively). Lower courts within the Second Circuit also have adopted this approach. See, e.g., 
Villanti v. Cold Spring Harbor Cent. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 2d 371, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(collecting cases); Primmer v. CBS Studios, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 248, 257 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(collecting cases and noting that “all courts, in this Circuit and elsewhere, that have addressed the 
question of whether the ADAAA applies retroactively to claims filed before its effective date 
have answered in the negative”); Schroeder v. Suffolk Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 07-CV-2060, 2009 
WL 1748869, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (referencing “the numerous other circuit and 
district courts that have held that the ADAA amendments do not apply to conduct prior to the
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effective date of the statute”). In light of this authority, this Court concludes that the ADAAA 
should not apply retroactively. Here, the relevant conduct at issue occurred in the fall of 2008; 
therefore, the Court applies the interpretation of disability in existence at that time.5
Prior to the ADAAA, § 12102(2) defined disability as: “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of having such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2). Subsection (C)’s reference to “such an impairment” refers to “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual.” See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. “There are two apparent ways in which individuals may 
fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a 
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered 
entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.” Id. In either scenario, the “impairment, whether real or imagined, . . . is 
regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.” Id. at 490; see also E.E.O.C. v. J.B. Hunt
5 For the first time, at oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff argued that the ADAAA 
should apply to Plaintiff’s discrimination claim, because President Richards denied Plaintiff’s 
appeal of the Board of Inquiry disciplinary decision on January 15, 2009. But, according to 
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Defendant’s allegedly discriminatory conduct, namely 
limiting Plaintiff’s participation in the phlebotomy portions of Clinical Training I, occurred 
while he was enrolled in that course during the 2008 fall semester. (SAC 12-15.) In fact, 
Plaintiff’s retaliation theory, that the October 27, 2008 letter from counsel ultimately triggered 
retaliatory disciplinary sanctions, (id. ^ 30), presumes that the complained-of discrimination 
occurred before any disciplinary proceedings were instituted. Therefore, President Richards’ 
decision to accept the Board’s disciplinary findings is not relevant conduct with respect to 
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim. And, as noted below, Plaintiff does not even claim that 
President Richards’ decision was an act of retaliation. Instead, at oral argument, counsel for 
Plaintiff explained that the only retaliatory act that Plaintiff has identified was the November 
2008 decision by Contarino to refer Plaintiff for discipline. Therefore, all of the allegedly 
actionable conduct in this case pre-dated January 1, 2009.
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Transp., Inc., 321 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that “regarded as” disabled claims 
require evidence “that [defendant] perceived [plaintiffs] as substantially limited in their ability to 
perform a major life activity”); Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. PoliceDep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2d Cir. 
1998) (explaining that “in order to prevail, the plaintiffs were required to adduce evidence that the 
[defendant] regarded each [plaintiff] as having an impairment that substantially limited a major 
life activity”). Thus, the key question is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether OCCC regarded Plaintiff’s shaking hands as substantially limiting a major life activity.
Plaintiff does not specify which major life activities OCCC perceived as substantially 
limited. From Plaintiff’s description that “Sander’s perception” of “[Plaintiff’s ‘shaking hands’” 
resulted in OCCC “disallow[ing] [him] from completing the [Lab Tech] program,” (Pl. Mem. at 
8-9), the Court surmises that Plaintiff’s theory is that OCCC regarded Plaintiff’s shaking hands as 
substantially limiting his major life activity of working.
As it appeared in 2008, the Code of Federal Regulations directed that “[w]ith respect to 
the major life activity of working,” “[t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted 
in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to 
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life 
activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2008); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (“When 
the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially 
limits’ requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs.”); Hammond v. Keyspan Energy, 349 F. App’x 629, 631 (2d Cir. 2009) (“When the major 
life activity in question is working, the plaintiff must be perceived as unable to perform a ‘broad 
class ofjobs.’”). Therefore, where “the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that [plaintiff]
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is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job,” summary judgment is 
appropriate, because “[t]his is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that [plaintiff] is regarded 
as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.” Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 526 (1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment where “at most, petitioner 
has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job 
requires driving a commercial motor vehicle” and “has put forward no evidence that he is 
regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job” (emphasis added)); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 
493 (holding that plaintiffs’ exclusion from the job of global airline pilot was “a single job,” and 
did not constitute a substantial limitation on working where other jobs, such as regional pilot and 
pilot instructor, were available); J.B. Hunt, 321 F.3d at 75 (holding that driving freight-carrying 
tractor-trailer trucks over long distances for extended periods of time is a “specific job with 
specific requirements,” and therefore exclusion from that job was not a substantial limitation on 
working).
Courts have applied this same analysis to cases involving hand shaking or similar issues to 
find that there was no perceived disability where the hand condition affected only one particular 
job, rather than a class ofjobs. See E.E.O.C. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 406 F. Supp.
2d 1228, 1235 (W.D. Okla. 2005) (finding no perceived disability where plaintiff had weakened 
left arm and diminished grip strength, because it did not prevent him from a class of jobs, only the 
specific job of train conductor), aff’d 211 F. App’x 682 (10th Cir. 2006); Cutler v. Hamden Bd. o f 
Educ., 150 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358-59 (D. Conn. 2001) (collecting cases holding that carpal tunnel 
syndrome is not a disability under the ADA where it limits only a specific job); cf. Quint v. A.E. 
Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 9-13 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding verdict of liability resulting from 
plaintiff’s disability of recurrent and permanent bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome where plaintiff
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presented evidence that the syndrome prevented her from performing manual labor, plaintiff lived 
in a region largely offering physically demanding jobs, and plaintiff’s education and work 
experience likely would restrict her to those jobs); Fink v. Printed Circuit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 
119, 124 (D. Mass. 2002) (denying summary judgment on question of whether plaintiff’s 
condition of Graves disease was a disability where symptoms included “fatigue, memory loss, 
and lack of muscle control,” as well as shaking hands); Badgley v. Law Sch. Admission Council, 
Inc., No. 99-CV-0103, 2000 WL 33225418, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2000) (finding disability 
where plaintiff had “essential tremors that substantially limit his major life activity of writing” as 
well as a visual impairment causing double vision that impaired the major life activity of seeing).
In this case, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates, that at most, OCCC perceived 
Plaintiff as unable to complete the phlebotomy portion of his clinical rotation, thus preventing 
him from receiving a Medical Laboratory Technician license. Plaintiff does not argue, much less 
set forth any evidence, that Defendant perceived him as unable to perform a class of jobs; on the 
contrary, the evidence indicates that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as able to perform medical 
laboratory technician jobs that did not require him to draw blood directly from patients. 
(Contarino Dep. at 82; Contarino Aff. ^ 2; SAC ^ 13.) Therefore, because the undisputed 
evidence indicates that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as unable to perform only one specific job, 
that of a licensed phlebotomist, rather than a class of jobs, Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on 
the basis of a perceived disability fails, and the Court grants summary judgment with respect to 
the Title II claims.6
6 Defendant also argues that Sander’s perception of his disability is irrelevant, because 
she was not an OCCC employee. (Def. Reply at 5.) Because the Court has determined that there 
is no material dispute as to whether Plaintiff was perceived to be disabled as defined by the 
ADA, it need not reach the question of whether Sander’s employer is relevant.
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2. Retaliation Claim
Defendant next challenges Plaintiff’s claim that OCCC retaliated against him due to his 
complaints about discriminatory treatment.7 At the outset, it is important to clarify precisely what 
Plaintiff identifies as the protected conduct and the retaliation. At oral argument, counsel for 
Plaintiff explained that the protected conduct was the letter from Plaintiff’s counsel dated October 
27, 2008, and the retaliation was Contarino’s referral of the disciplinary matter to Broadie.8
The ADA provides that: “No person shall discriminate against any individual because 
such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such
7 Neither Party addresses the viability of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim if the Court were to 
find, as it did above, that Defendant did not perceive Plaintiff as having a disability. In general, 
“[a] plaintiff may prevail on a claim for retaliation even when the underlying conduct 
complained of was not in fact unlawful so long as he can establish that he possessed a good faith, 
reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated [the] law.” 
Treglia v. Town o f Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant does not argue, nor is there any indication in the record, that Plaintiff’s belief in 
Defendant’s discrimination was in bad faith or unreasonable; therefore, the Court will consider 
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim independent of its conclusion with respect to Plaintiff’s Title II 
claim.
8 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s summary judgment papers include new claims that do 
not appear in the Second Amended Complaint. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 
the “interference prohibition of the ADA” in addition to the retaliation claim, (Pl. Mem. at 13), a 
claim that appears nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint. Second, as part of the 
retaliation discussion, Plaintiff alludes to “ongoing reasonable accommodations during the 
academic portions of his program,” (Pl. Mem. at 10), and claims that “Contarino[] gain[ed] 
knowledge that [P]laintiff sought and received a 504 accommodation based on his mental status, 
i.e., depression and anxiety,” (Pl. Mem. at 9 n.3). But, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 
affirmatively states that Plaintiff does not suffer from any disability, (SAC ^ 3), and does not 
refer to any perceived disability other than the shaking hands. Particularly in light of the fact 
that Plaintiff declined an additional opportunity to request leave to amend his complaint prior to 
the instant motion, (Dkt. No. 17), the Court will not consider these additional claims raised for 
the first time in Plaintiff’s motion papers. See Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 
2001) (refusing to consider factual allegations made for the first time in summary judgment 
papers); Ifill v. New York State Court Officers Ass’n, 655 F. Supp. 2d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(explaining that a complaint may not be amended by making new claims in motion papers).
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individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The Second Circuit has 
identified four elements for a prima facie case of retaliation: “(i) a plaintiff was engaged in 
protected activity; (ii) the alleged retaliator knew that plaintiff was involved in protected activity; 
(iii) an adverse decision or course of action was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal 
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Weixel, 287 F.3d at 148 
(internal quotes omitted).
“Claims for retaliation are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework 
established for Title VII cases.” Treglia v. Town o f Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002). 
At the prima facie stage, a plaintiff’s burden is “de minimis.” Id. Once a plaintiff establishes the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant “to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 
for the challenged employment decision.” Id. at 721; see also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., No. 
11-CV-1743, 2013 WL 627710, at *7 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2013) (describing the burden shifting 
framework for a summary judgment claim in a Title VII suit). “If a defendant meets this burden, 
the plaintiff must point to evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to 
conclude that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation.” 
Treglia, 313 F.3d at 721(internal quotation marks omitted).9
9 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s burden of persuasion is not entirely clear. In Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging 
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) were required to “prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence . . . that age was the ‘but for’ cause of the challenged employer 
decision.” Id. at 177-78. The Supreme Court explained that the “motivating factor” language in 
Title VII permits plaintiffs to advance claims by demonstrating that discrimination formed part 
of the motive (the so-called “mixed motive” standard), whereas the ADEA’s “because” language 
requires the “but-for” causation standard. Id .
In the Second Circuit, prior to Gross, courts applied the “mixed-motive analysis available 
in the Title VII context” to ADA claims, see Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326,
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Defendant challenges the second and fourth elements, arguing that Defendant did not 
know of Plaintiff’s discrimination complaint and that there was no causal connection between the 
complaint and the disciplinary proceedings.10 (Def. Mem. at 11-17.)
336 (2d Cir. 2000), but given that the ADEA and ADA use similar “because” language in the 
relevant provisions, it is not clear whether this framework survives Gross, see Bolmer v.
Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “it is questionable whether Title II 
discrimination claims can proceed on a mixed-motive theory after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Gross . . . where the Court held that the [ADEA] does not authorize a mixed-motive 
age-discrimination claim,” but ultimately not deciding the issue); Saviano v. Town o f Westport, 
No. 04-CV-522, 2011 WL 4561184, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that “the but-for 
causation standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gross applies in the ADA retaliation 
context”); Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 n.40 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (applying the mixed motive standard and noting that although recent “Supreme Court case 
law may indicate that the Court would disapprove of this [mixed-motives] causation standard, 
and would instead mandate a higher ‘but-for’ standard . . . as the Supreme Court has not yet 
discussed causation specifically with respect to the ADA, this court will follow controlling 
Second Circuit jurisprudence”). Other circuits have issued more definitive statements adopting 
the ‘but-for’ Gross standard for ADA claims. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 
F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The ADEA and the ADA bar discrimination ‘because of’ an 
employee’s age or disability, meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a ‘but-for’ cause 
of the employer’s adverse decision. The same standard applies to both laws.” (citing Gross, 557 
U.S. at 176)); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(applying Gross to the ADA by holding that “in the absence of any additional text bringing 
mixed-motive claims within the reach of the [ADA], the statute’s ‘because of’ language 
demands proof that a forbidden consideration—here, the employee’s perceived disability—was a 
‘but for’ cause of the adverse action”); see also Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 74 (1st Cir. 
2012) (applying Gross to the causation analysis resulting from the “because” language of the 
Rehabilitation Act’s retaliation provision).
This Court agrees that the ADEA and ADA “because” language is similar, implying that 
their respective burdens of persuasion are likely equivalent and thus casting doubt on the 
continued applicability of the pre-Gross mixed motives ADA case law. However, this Court 
need not resolve this question, because, as explained below, Plaintiff has failed to present 
evidence sufficient to meet either burden.
10 Neither Party addresses the third element of the prima facie case: whether Contarino’s 
referral to Broadie constitutes an adverse decision or course of action. In Burlington Northern 
and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), a Title VII case, the Supreme 
Court explained that a plaintiff pursuing a retaliation claim “must show that a reasonable 
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context 
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t
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a. Second Element: Defendant’s Knowledge of Protected Activity
With respect to the second element, whether Defendant knew that Plaintiff was involved 
in a protected activity, Defendant argues that Contarino did not know of the October 27, 2008 
letter from Plaintiff’s counsel at the time of her November 5, 2008 referral to Broadie. In order to 
satisfy the knowledge element, it is not necessary that Plaintiff demonstrate that any particular 
actor knew of the letter, only that Defendant had general corporate knowledge. See Gordon v. 
New York City Bd. o f Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Neither [the Second Circuit] nor 
any other circuit has ever held that, to satisfy the knowledge requirement, anything more is 
necessary than general corporate knowledge that the plaintiff has engaged in a protected 
activity.”); see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. o f Pharmacy o f Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 92 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (explaining that the knowledge requirement is met “if the legal entity was on notice” 
and that “a jury is entitled to disregard [individual agents’ claims of unawareness of the protected 
activity] if they are unreliable”).
During her deposition, Contarino testified that she did not remember when she received
o f Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that the proper analysis considers 
the objective standard of a “reasonable worker”); see also Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 381 F. App’x 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying the Burlington Northern standard to an ADA 
retaliation claim).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that Contarino’s referral to Broadie for disciplinary action 
was a materially adverse action, and drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, this Court agrees 
that a disciplinary referral could deter protected activity. See O ’Neal v. State Univ. o f New York, 
No. 01-CV-7802, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (finding that letter 
informing plaintiff that she was the subject of a disciplinary investigation was a material adverse 
action); Doucet v. Univ. o f Cincinnati, No. 05-CV-148, 2006 WL 2044955, at *22 n.19 (S.D. 
Ohio July 19, 2006) (explaining that “[t]he initiation of a formal disciplinary 
investigation—even one that does not result in formal discipline” satisfies the “materially 
adverse” standard), aff’d 2007 WL 2445993 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2007); see also Rattigan v. 
Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[W]hether an action is ‘materially adverse’ is 
determined by whether it holds a deterrent prospect of harm, and not by whether the harm comes 
to pass or whether any effects are felt in the present.”).
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the letter dated October 27, 2008, (Contarino Dep. at 84), while Plaintiff testified that he 
personally believed, based on conversations with his attorney, that the October 27, 2008 meeting 
occurred “the same day that [Contarino] received the letter,” (Widomski Dep. at 62, 67 (emphasis 
added).) Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, a jury could determine that 
Contarino herself, or OCCC generally, may have known of the letter dated October 27, 2008 by 
the time of the alleged retaliation on November 5, 2008.11 Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied his de 
minimis burden as to the second element.
b. Fourth Element: Causal Connection
With respect to the fourth element, Defendant argues that there was no causal connection 
between the letter from Plaintiff’s counsel and Contarino’s referral.12 (Def. Mem. at 12-17.)
11 Defendant also argues that Broadie had no personal knowledge of the October 27,
2008 letter at the time of his November 11, 2008 meeting with Plaintiff, (Def. Mem. at 12), and 
the Parties do not dispute this fact, except insofar as Plaintiff’s wife suggested during the 
meeting that she thought its purpose was to address a letter. (Def. 56.1 ^ 30; Pl. 56.1 ^ 27; 
Widomski Dep. at 69; Broadie Dep. at 55-57.) However, because general corporate knowledge 
is sufficient to meet this element, Broadie’s personal knowledge, or lack thereof, is not 
dispositive. Moreover, at oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff clarified that the retaliatory action 
was Contarino’s referral of the matter to Broadie; therefore, the knowledge at issue is 
Contarino’s knowledge at the time of that referral not subsequent meetings.
12 As explained previously, at oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff clarified that the 
retaliatory action at issue is Contarino’s referral of the matter to Broadie, not any of the other 
actions described in the Complaint such as Broadie’s referral to the Board of Inquiry, the Board 
of Inquiry’s recommendation to sanction Plaintiff, or the subsequent decisions implementing the 
Board’s recommendation. To the extent that Plaintiff continues to allege that these other actions 
constituted retaliation, Plaintiff’s causation argument would be viable if he had some evidence 
that these individuals were aware of Plaintiff’s protected activity.
“The lack of knowledge on the part of particular individual agents is admissible as some 
evidence of a lack of a causal connection, countering plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence of 
proximity or disparate treatment.” Gordon v. New York City Bd. o f Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). “A jury, however, can find retaliation even if the agent denies 
direct knowledge of a plaintiff’s protected activities, for example, so long as the jury finds that 
the circumstances evidence knowledge of the protected activities or the jury concludes that an 
agent is acting explicitly or implicit[ly] upon the orders of a superior who has the requisite
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Plaintiff relies on the temporal proximity between the October 27, 2008 letter and Contarino’s 
referral to Broadie on November 5, 2008 as evidence for a causal connection. (Pl. Mem at 13.) 
The Second Circuit has “held that a close temporal relationship between a plaintiff’s participation 
in protected activity and [defendant’s] adverse actions can be sufficient to establish causation.” 
Treglia, 313 F.3d at 720; see also Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City o f Middletown, 
294 F.3d 35, 54 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiff controlled the 
timing of both the drafting of the letter and the faxing of the documents that began the 
disciplinary process. (Def. Reply at 6.) But, Plaintiff did not control the timing of the decision to 
begin the disciplinary process. To the extent Defendant may be suggesting that Plaintiff
knowledge.” Id.; see also Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A 
causal connection is sufficiently demonstrated if the agent who decides to impose the adverse 
action but is ignorant of the plaintiff’s protected activity acts pursuant to encouragement by a 
superior (who has knowledge) to disfavor the plaintiff.” (emphasis in original)).
In this case, there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that the Board of Inquiry, a 
body composed of professors and students with no connection to Plaintiff, knew of the October 
27, 2008 letter or acted based on any retaliatory motives. And with respect to Broadie, the 
Parties agree that he had no knowledge of the letter at the time of his November 5, 2008 meeting 
with Plaintiff, which was his last involvement prior to the Board of Inquiry decision. (Def. 56.1 
^ 30; Pl. 56.1 ^ 27; Widomski Dep. at 69; Broadie Dep. at 55-57.) Nor is there any evidence that 
the alleged retaliator Contarino (or even Sander) played a “meaningful role” in the Board’s 
decision or that the Board was “overly deferential,” such that Defendant might be liable under a 
so-called “cat’s paw scenario.” See Herbert v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., No. 08-CV-1945, 2012 
WL 201758, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2012) (“Accordingly, the theory of liability that the 
‘impermissible bias of a single individual can infect the entire group of collective decision 
makers . . . at least when the decisionmakers are overly deferential to the biased individuals’ 
recommendations’ is one that is well accepted by courts within this Circuit.” (emphasis added)); 
Saviano v. Town o f Westport, No. 04-CV-522, 2011 WL 4561184, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 
2011) (describing a cat’s paw scenario as one where “a nondecisionmaker with a discriminatory 
motive dupes an innocent decisionmaker into taking action against the plaintiff”); cf. Summa v. 
Hofstra Univ., No. 11-CV-1743, 2013 WL 627710, at *8 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 2013) (reversing grant 
of summary judgment in light of evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
agents with knowledge of plaintiff’s protected activity encouraged decisionmaker to engage in 
adverse action); Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (in Title VII 
context, noting that the bias of a single individual with a “meaningful role in the [decision]” can 
taint the ultimate decision (emphasis added)).
23
somehow knew disciplinary proceedings were impending and conspired to send the letter in order 
to set up a retaliation claim, this theory does not find support from undisputed evidence. 
Therefore, relying on temporal proximity, Plaintiff has met his de minimis burden of establishing 
a prima facie case for retaliation.
As described above, where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
back to the defendant. See Treglia, 313 F.3d at 721. Here, Defendant meets this burden by 
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Contarino’s referral, namely her good 
faith belief that Plaintiff violated the student code of conduct by falsifying documents. (Def. 
Mem. at 13-17.) The Court finds that Contarino’s claimed good faith belief is supported by the 
record. The October 1 and October 29 urinalysis reports are literally carbon copies of each other 
with exactly the same contents except an altered date and the addition of a “Y” indicating 
competency on the latter report. (Contarino Aff. at ex. D.) The same is true of the October 8 and 
October 29 hematology reports with the exception of an added “29” written over the “8” in the 
date field as well as a “Yes” indicating competency in the latter report. (Contarino Aff. at ex. E.) 
Additionally, the numbers of procedures observed and performed are identical in the two sets of 
reports, belying Plaintiff’s explanation that he altered the forms to add progress to the prior 
reports. (Def. Mem. at 16; Widomski Dep. 101-02.) These suspicious submissions provide 
powerful and undisputed evidence for Contarino’s good faith belief that Plaintiff doctored the 
documents as the reason for her referral of the matter to Broadie.
As such, it matters not if Plaintiff did not forge these reports, as he insists. (SAC ^ 25; Pl. 
Mem. at 13.) Rather, what does matter is that Defendant has offered evidence that Contarino had
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a good faith basis for believing that Plaintiff had falsified the new reports.13 See Dister v. 
Continental Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that because “[e]vidence 
that [defendant] made a poor business judgment in [its adverse employment decision] generally is 
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the credibility of the [defendant’s] 
reasons . . . [,] the reasons tendered need not be well-advised, but merely truthful”); Chu v. Tex. S. 
Univ., No. 10-CV-2582, 2012 WL 256419, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012) (granting summary 
judgment in Title VII case where “[d]efendant articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for discharge: [p]laintiff allegedly plagiarized a scientific grant proposal”); Duckett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., No. 07-CV-6204, 2009 WL 995614, at *11-12 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009) (noting 
that “when analyzing a pretext claim the inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason is the 
actual reason for the challenged action and not whether the employer’s stated reason for its 
decision is ill-advised, mistaken, or unreasonable,” and granting summary judgment where 
defendant claimed that it terminated plaintiff due to her unauthorized use of a discount, a claim 
plaintiff disputed (citing Dister, 859 F.2d at 1116)).
Once Defendant has met its burden, the question becomes whether Plaintiff has 
established sufficient evidence such that a rational factfinder could conclude that Defendant’s 
“explanation [was] merely pretext for impermissible retaliation.” See Treglia, 313 F.3d at 721 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In discussing a plaintiff’s burden at this stage, the Supreme 
Court has noted in the context of Title VII that “a reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for 13
13 Moreover, after considering these same documents, the Board of Inquiry found that 
Plaintiff did falsify the reports, thus adding evidence that Contarino’s view was held in good 
faith. As described above, supra note 12, Plaintiff has no viable claim that the Board of Inquiry, 
whose members included professors and students with no connection to Plaintiff, acted on 
anything other than their independent determination that the documents were forged.
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discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the
real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
Put differently, “[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the [defendant]; the factfinder must believe 
the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 519 (emphasis in original). As 
the Second Circuit very recently explained, “there are two distinct ways for a plaintiff to 
prevail—either by proving that a discriminatory motive, more likely than not, motivated the 
defendants or by proving both that the reasons given by the defendants are not true and that 
discrimination is the real reason for the actions.” Summa, 2013 WL 627710, at *11 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Consistent with this axiom, courts within the Second Circuit have 
regularly held that in order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must offer some evidence that 
the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by discrimination. See Weinstock v. Columbia 
Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[f]or the case to continue, the plaintiff 
must then come forward with evidence that the defendant’s proffered, non-discriminatory reason 
is a mere pretext for actual discrimination” (emphasis added)); Renz v. Grey Adver., Inc., 135 
F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] discrimination plaintiff may not succeed by proving only 
that a proffered explanation is false but must prove that discrimination motivated the adverse 
action . . . .”); Christoff v. Saturn Bus. Sys., No. 10-CV-8505, 2013 WL 394131, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 1, 2013) (granting summary judgment and explaining that “the record is devoid of any 
evidence that would suggest that Defendants’ stated reasons for [their] actions are pretext or that 
Plaintiff was discriminated against in any way on the basis of her gender”); McPhatter v. New 
York City, No. 06-CV-1181, 2009 WL 2412980 at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (granting 
summary judgment because “[d]efendants have offered a nondiscriminatory reason for [plaintiff’s 
suspension], . . . even if a jury were to disbelieve the reason offered by defendant, it could not
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rationally find that this reason was a pretext for discriminating against her in violation of the 
ADA”); Webster v. Pomperaug Reg'l Sch. Dist. 15, No. 04-CV-1265, 2007 WL 987539, at *16 
(D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2007) (“Even if [defendant’s] asserted reason is false, no reasonable jury 
could conclude, based on the record as a whole, that the plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for 
requesting accommodations or filing a complaint . . . .”); cf. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 
596 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that “a reasonable juror could find, not only that the 
explanations given by [defendant] for [plaintiff’s] termination were pretextual, but also that, 
together with [defendant’s] passing comment . . . it was her age that was the ‘but for’ cause of 
[plaintiff’s] termination” ). It is not always necessary that a plaintiff set forth specific evidence 
showing retaliation: credible evidence that a defendant’s explanation is false along with a strong 
prima facie case may support an inference that the adverse action was motivated by 
discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48 (2000) 
(explaining that in case where plaintiff made a “substantial showing” that defendant’s explanation 
was false, trier of fact could infer that adverse action was motivated by discrimination); see also 
Reg'lEcon. Cmty. Action Program, 294 F.3d at 54 (vacating district court’s grant of summary 
judgment where “defendants offer no evidentiary support for the non-retaliatory reasons they 
proffer, and [the court found] no indication in the record” that those reasons were true).
In this case, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Defendant’s explanation is a 
false pretext for a retaliatory motive. At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff argued that 
Contarino and Sander conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff, and in response to questioning from 
the Court, counsel identified as supporting evidence only Contarino and Sander’s “close”
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relationship as shown by their previous discussion of Plaintiff’s shaking hands.14 While 
Contarino and Sander admittedly discussed Plaintiff’s “shaking hand problem” early in the 
semester, (Sander Dep. at 58-59), Plaintiff’s extrapolation that Contarino and Sander then jointly 
decided to retaliate against Plaintiff following the October 27, 2008 letter from his counsel finds 
no support in the record and is just pure speculation. In fact, there is not even evidence that 
Sander knew of the October 27, 2008 letter at the time of the referral nor is there any indication 
that Sander had any role in the referral itself, much less one motivated by a retaliatory animus.15
Similarly, Plaintiff’s summary judgment papers do not identify any evidence beyond his 
personal belief: “I believe Mrs. C[o]ntarino’s actions in bringing charges against me were in 
retaliation for having complained about the discriminatory treatment . . . .” (Pl. Decl. ^ 14.)
These conclusory assertions alone are insufficient to allow the jury to infer a retaliatory motive.
14 Because the Court ultimately finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish his retaliation 
claim, the Court need not determine whether Defendant would be liable for the actions of 
Sander, an employee of CRMC, and not of OCCC. See Morrissette v. Honeywell Bldg. Solutions 
SES Corp, No. 10-CV-12, 2011 WL 3652428, at *9 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2011) (“This Court 
declines [plaintiff’s] invitation to extend ‘cat’s paw’ liability where, as here, the ‘subordinate’ is 
an employee of an entity with which the corporate defendant had an arms-length contractual 
relationship.”); Johnson v. BE & K Const. Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 2010) 
(granting summary judgment on other grounds, but “recogniz[ing] that the factual setting of this 
case presents a somewhat different picture than the traditional cat’s paw scenario, namely in the 
fact that the ‘supervisor’ who allegedly harbored a discriminatory animus toward Plaintiff
. . . was an ADM employee, not [defendant’s] employee,” noting that “[defendant] can only 
conceivably be liable for alleged discriminatory conduct by ADM under some type of agency 
theory of liability, such as the cat’s paw theory,” and expressing “serious reservations as to 
whether this factual scenario is a proper expansion of the cat’s paw theory”); see generally 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that cat’s paw theory is 
based on agency principles).
15 At oral argument, Plaintiff briefly suggested that Sander’s absence at the Board of 
Inquiry hearing is evidence that she was having “second thoughts” about her involvement in 
referring Plaintiff for discipline. This speculation is wholly unsupported by any record evidence; 
in fact, the only evidence on Sander’s absence is her undisputed statement that she did not attend 
the Board hearing as a result of work obligations. (Sander Dep. at 7-8.)
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See Jeffries v. Verizon, No. 10-CV-2686, 2012 WL 4344197, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) 
(“[Plaintiff] does not provide any evidence to support the contention that his transfer was in any 
way related to his hearing impairment or any other activity protected under the ADA. Therefore, 
the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
[defendant’s] stated reason for transferring [plaintiff] was a mere pretext for its real intention to 
retaliate.”), adopted by 2012 WL 4344188 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012); Schupbach v. Shinseki, No. 
09-CV-3513, 2012 WL 3638791, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (“[P]laintiff cannot simply 
substitute utter speculation for the competent proof that would be necessary to permit rational 
inferences by a jury of discrimination or retaliation.”); McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 
2d 366, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“A motion for summary judgment [in the instant ADA case] may 
not be defeated by speculation and conclusory assertions.”).
Nor is the evidence that Plaintiff presented in support of his prima facie case sufficient at 
this stage to rebut Defendant’s explanation. First, Plaintiff’s statement that he did not fabricate 
the documents, even taken as true, does not actually rebut Contarino’s claim of a good faith belief 
that Plaintiff did fabricate them. Plaintiff’s claim and Contarino’s belief are not mutually 
exclusive: Plaintiff may not have fabricated the documents, but Contarino could still have a good 
faith belief, albeit mistaken, that he did. See Wontrobski v. S. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 
No. 02-CV-3755, 2005 WL 1785261, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2005) (“Plaintiff[’s] sole 
argument for pretext is that she was undeserving of her unsatisfactory evaluations . . . . However, 
Plaintiff’s subjective disagreement with [her] reviews is not a viable basis for a discrimination 
claim.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); O ’Connor v. Coll. o f 
Saint Rose, No. 04-CV-0318, 2005 WL 2739106, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) (granting 
summary judgment based on Defendant’s “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for [plaintiff’s]
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failing grades—plagiarism” and noting that “Plaintiff has failed to sustain his ultimate burden of 
demonstrating that Defendant’s claim of plagiarism was a pretext for unlawful discrimination,” 
because “Defendant’s proffered reason appears to be true,” and “Plaintiff has not otherwise 
proffered sufficient evidence from which a fair-minded trier of fact could reasonably conclude 
that Defendant failed Plaintiff in retaliation for his filing grievances or claims of discrimination”). 
Indeed, nothing in the record undermines Contarino’s claim of a good faith belief that Plaintiff 
falsified the documents; on the contrary, as noted above, a comparison of the urinalysis and 
hematology summary reports provides evidence from which one easily could conclude that the 
October 29 reports were falsified, as the Board of Inquiry itself determined. Put simply, 
Plaintiff’s explanation of the markings on the reports is internally inconsistent and belied by the 
documents themselves, and therefore Plaintiff has failed to refute Contarino’s claim of a good 
faith belief. See Shepheard v. New York City Corr. Dep’t, 360 F. App’x 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff did not establish that the “proffered reason 
for [the adverse action],” a disciplinary charge, was false or “a pretext for discrimination”); Cf. 
Treglia, 313 F.3d at 722 (summary judgment denied where statements by defendant showed 
discrimination and record evidence refuted defendant’s explanation); Saviano, 2011 WL 
4561184, at *7 (finding evidence of pretext where record itself suggested that defendant’s 
explanation was false, and the court found it “abundantly clear . . . that [defendants] disliked 
plaintiff”).
Second, while temporal proximity may be sufficient for a prima facie case, it is 
insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory intent given the undisputed evidence of Defendant’s 
explanation. See Reilly v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., No. 93-CV-7317, 1996 WL 665620, at 
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1996) (“The timing of events alone, even if sufficient to meet plaintiff’s
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prima facie burden, cannot defeat summary judgment in the face of defendant’s proffered 
legitimate reason.”); see also Bombero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 196, 210 n.28 (D. 
Conn. 2000) (collecting cases). The record reveals that the inquiry into Plaintiff’s failure to 
comply with the course requirements and the impact of his shaking hands condition began long 
before the letter from Plaintiff’s counsel. As early as October 7, 2008, twenty days before 
Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter, Contarino met with Plaintiff to discuss his missing reports, a 
discussion apparently sufficiently serious to warrant a signed agreement stating that Plaintiff 
would receive an F in the course if he did not submit the required documentation. (Contarino Aff. 
at ex. C.) The fact that a follow-up meeting in which Plaintiff agreed to submit additional reports 
occurred the same day that a letter from Plaintiff’s counsel was drafted and that, shortly 
thereafter, Contarino scrutinized Plaintiff’s facially suspect reports does not, by itself, rebut 
Defendant’s explanation.
Therefore, because Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant’s 
credible explanation for Contarino’s referral, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish 
that there is enough disputed evidence to substantiate the fourth element of causation, and the 
Court grants summary judgment for Defendant as to the retaliation claim.
3. State Law Claim
Because there are no remaining federal claims in the lawsuit, the Court declines to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim pursuant to the New 
York Human Rights Law section 296(2)(a). (SAC ^ 33.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Kolari v. New 
York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “in the usual case in 
which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point 
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims” (internal quotation
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marks omitted)).16
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending motion, (Dkt. No. 22), and 
close this case.
SO ORDERED.
16 Plaintiffs state law claim also may be barred on sovereign immunity grounds, because 
New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for NYHRL suits in federal 
courts. (Def. Mem. at 17-19.) See Tuckett v. N.Y. State Dep't of Tax. & Fin., No. 99-CV-0679, 
2000 WL 1028662, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2000) (explaining that New York has not consented 
to be sued in federal court with respect to NYHRL claims); see also Smith v. State Univ. of New 
York, No. 00-CV1454, 2003 WL 1937208, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003) (“[T]he district courts 
in this Circuit have repeatedly held that the New York Human Rights Law does not include a 
waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity to suit in federal court.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The Parties dispute whether OCCC should be considered an arm of the state for 
Eleventh Amendment purposes. (Def. Mem. at 19; PI. Mem. at 10-12.) See, e.g., Kohlhausen v. 
SUNYRockland Cmty. Coll, No. 10-CV-3168, 2011 WL 1404934, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) 
(examining Rockland Community College’s funding structure to determine that “community 
colleges are ultimately accountable to, and dependent upon, the state” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), amended 2011 WL 2749560 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011). However, because the Court 
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it need not determine the sovereign immunity 
issue. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) 
(explaining that a “federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying 
audience to a case on the merits” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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